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Dying before one’s time has been a prominent theme in classic literature and
poetry. Catherine Linton’s youthful death in Wuthering Heights leaves behind
a bereft Heathcliff and generations of mourning readers. The author herself,
Emily Bronte¨, died young from tuberculosis. John Keats’ Ode on Melancholy
captures the transitory beauty of 19th century human lives too often ravished by
early death. Keats also died of tuberculosis, aged 25. ‘‘The bloom, whose petals
nipped before they blew, died on the promise of the fruit’’ is how Percy Bysshe
Shelley expressed his grief over Keats’ death.1 Emily Dickinson wrote So Has
a Daisy Vanished, being driven into depression by the early loss of loved ones
from typhoid and tuberculosis.2
Today, tuberculosis is often understood as a disease that ended its blight on
human lives in the Victorian Period.3 However, as noted in the introduction to
this symposium, in 2008, 1.3 million people died from the disease,4 and the fight
against it is certainly not over. In the context of access to medicines and
intellectual property rights (IPRs), the contemporary example of tuberculosis
can serve three purposes.
Access to life-saving medicines for the poor is hampered by many factors, of
which the current intellectual property rights system is only one. Standardly
available, low-cost, accurately prescribed antibiotics do not reach many tuber-
culosis sufferers in developing countries. This may be because of a shortage of
doctors and nurses, a shortage of pharmacies, or the nonaffordability of even
low-cost drugs to the poor (see also the diagram, ‘‘State of Health,’’ in Klaus
Leisinger’s contribution to this symposium5). When patients follow the wrong
treatment regimes or stop a course of antibiotics because they feel better and/or
because they can no longer afford to continue the treatment, then drug-resistant
strains of the bacillus emerge, leading to the second point.
Multidrug resistant strains of tuberculosis often cannot be cured by low-cost,
first-line drugs but require second-line or third-line drugs.6 This is particularly
true when tuberculosis occurs together with HIV/AIDS. As an example, one
treatment that is well tolerated by sufferers of HIV-related tuberculosis, Myco-
butin, is still under patent protection and is therefore priced beyond the reach of
the poor.7 This leads to the access problem described in the introduction to the
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symposium: medicines are not affordable to the poor because of intellectual
property rights protection.
Despite the high number of deaths worldwide, tuberculosis is still regarded as
an orphan or neglected disease, illustrating what the symposium introduction
terms the availability problem (i.e., that drugs are not developed for the health
needs of the poor because incentives for pharmaceutical innovation are built
around patients’ ability to pay). Tuberculosis has recently been described as ‘‘the
most deadly of ’neglected’ diseases,’’8 and the European Commission has just
granted orphan drug status to Rifapentine, a new tuberculosis drug,9 confirming
that research on the disease has still not entered the mainstream.
In this article, we focus on the ways in which the access and availability
problems of drugs are aggravated by the current intellectual property rights
system. As quoted in the symposium introduction, it is estimated that 10 million
people die every year because they do not have access to life-saving drugs.10
First we ask on what basis intellectual property rights might be justified even
where they hamper access to drugs and the availability of medicines. We
distinguish between natural right justifications and those based on social utility.
After establishing that the natural right defense is unsuccessful, we compare
three relevant situations with regard to their social utility: after the passage of the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS; today),
pre-TRIPS, and no IPR protection.
Two Types of Social Rules
Human communities are organized by social rules, many of which are encoded
in law and administered through courts. Social rules may be understood in two
main ways: they may reflect ultimate moral requirements, whether these are
understood to be set down by God or our own innate moral sense, or dictated by
reason; or they may be understood as serving a social purpose within human
society.
The constitutional rights of individuals are typically understood in the first
way, reflecting, as John Rawls says, a person’s ‘‘inviolability founded on justice
which even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.’’11 The inviolability
of these rights applies across the globe and across time, and they are often
referred to as natural rights.12 The right not to be killed, suitably circumscribed
(to allow for self-defense, for instance), is considered such a right.13 Traffic rules,
on the other hand, are typically understood in the second way, in terms of their
contextual social utility as facilitators of efficient travel. Such social rules are
taken to be open to thoughtful revision in order to preserve or enhance their
usefulness under changing conditions. By contrast, rules expressing natural-law
requirements are considered to fall outside the power of societies to change.
The categorization of some social rules into one of these two categories is
contested. Thus, some argue that the social rule against torture is based on
expediency and may be revised or abolished in changed circumstances, whereas
others present this rule as founded on a natural right.14
The social rules that create and define property rights are subject to similar
contention: some assume that such rights should be designed to promote the
common good, specified as economic efficiency, for instance, or poverty
avoidance.15 Others, following John Locke, regard legal property rights as
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implementing preexisting natural rights to acquire things and to dispose of them
as one pleases.16 The two disputant groups may entirely agree on what the rules
should be and yet disagree profoundly on their justification.
Are Intellectual Property Rights Natural Rights?
The same disagreement as outlined regarding the topics of torture or property
rights also exists with regard to IPRs. Some hold that IPRs should be shaped with
an eye to the common good, striking the optimal balance between encouraging
innovations and ensuring easy access to them. Others believe that innovators
have a natural right to control the use of their innovation. This dispute was in
evidence in the 1990s, when affluent states successfully pressured less developed
states to accept the TRIPS agreement, which required them to legislate for very
extensive IPRs.
Some argued that adopting U.S.-style IPRs would benefit poor countries by
making them more innovative. Others argued that poor countries were morally
required to adopt extensive IPRs in order to suppress the natural-law crimes of
‘‘theft,’’ ‘‘piracy,’’ and ‘‘counterfeiting’’ that were being committed by copycat
manufacturers within their jurisdictions.
Which position is more defensible? Should IPRs be designed with social utility
in mind or help realize creators’ natural rights? One can offer three arguments
against the latter, natural-law understanding of IPRs.
First, IPRs can be shaped in myriad ways, each specifying differently their
mode of acquisition, scope, or duration. The most controversial debate in this
context surrounds so-called patents on life. Whereas patents on complex living
organisms, for example, pigs,17 are regularly granted in the United States, the
Canadian Supreme Court has ruled that higher life forms cannot be patented
within their jurisdiction. Hence, the famous oncomouse, patented in the United
States by Harvard University applicants, does not fall under patent protection in
Canada.18 Interestingly, the European Patent Office (EPO) at first rejected
Harvard’s patent application for the oncomouse, but later decided to grant the
patent, arguing that benefits to humanity outweighed the harm to the mice.19
This means that the EPO granted the patent on grounds of social utility rather
than the potential natural rights of the creators. The dispute is ongoing, given
that the German Green Party together with a large group of organizations is
currently lobbying the European Parliament to prohibit patents on higher life
forms in Europe.20
Within this context, it is important to remember the historical starting point.
Patents on life were originally regarded as incompatible with U.S. patent law in
1971, when the first case was considered. The now legendary Chakrabarty
application (Ananda Chakrabarty had produced a genetically engineered bacte-
ria that could clean oil spills) was first rejected by the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office. On appeal, the patent was granted by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals by a three to two majority. On a second appeal by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office to the U.S. Supreme Court, the patent was finally granted with
a five to four majority. It is clear that opinions were split on this issue even in the
United States. As Jeremy Rifkin has put it, this one case ‘‘laid the all-important
legal groundwork for the privatization and commodification of the genetic
commons.’’21 However, the above disagreement at supreme court level in several
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countries shows that it is certainly not obvious that patents on life are a natural
right of inventors.
Second, like ordinary property rights, IPRs often clash with other important
natural rights, such as the right to life. One of the best examples of this tension
can be found in the area of access to life-saving medication, the topic of this
article. As medicines under patent protection are priced under monopoly
conditions, their invariably high markups make them unaffordable to poor
patients. Given that IPR systems provide opportunities to stop generic
producers from offering cheap copies of new drugs, no alternative sources of
drug supply will be available to the poor, hence conflicting with, in the worst
case scenario, their right to life. The question, simply put, is whether the
creator of a life-saving medicine should have the legal authority to effectively
deny this medicine to those who cannot afford it. (We return to this topic
below).
Third, IPRs are not compatible with the natural-law understanding of property
rights adduced to support them. By asserting an IPR in an innovation, the
innovator claims not merely rights to the products made from their own
materials but also new property rights over the same materials owned by others,
who then lose their freedom to convert their materials into the same products.
Such a deprivation of freedom conflicts with the natural-law understanding of
property rights in material items, which protects owners against unilateral
expropriation by others. If the rights one has to use one’s own material property
cannot be diminished by others without the owner’s consent, then there can be
no IPRs; that is, no innovator can unilaterally impose restrictions on what others
are allowed to do with their own property.
An example22: in 1995, the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research (CSIR) obtained a patent concerning the appetite suppressant proper-
ties of a Kalahari succulent, the Hoodia. Efforts at developing commercial
products from the succulent are directed at the anti-obesity market. Since then,
patents have been obtained in the United States, the United Kingdom, continental
Europe, and Japan. Given the patent, the CSIR (or its sublicencees) can stop
competitors from bringing their own Hoodia slimming product to market. This
means, for instance, that impoverished communities in Namibia or local farmers
are unable to use the Hoodia plants growing in their own territories for
commercial gain within the anti-obesity market. As this is essentially the only
viable commercial opportunity involving this succulent, it renders the plant
worthless in terms of livelihoods. As a result, the property right in the physical
plant, and with it the right to do with it as one pleases (e.g., to sell it for a specific
purpose), has been taken away from the physical owners of the plant in favor of
those holding intellectual property rights.23 One can see here that the common
natural-law understanding of physical property rights—far from showing the
way to an analogous natural-law understanding of IPRs—actually provides
natural-law grounds against IPRs.
The above points throw sufficient doubt on the claim that creators have natural
rights to the protection of their intellectual property. It is indeed unlikely that
IPRs can be justified on natural law grounds. However, before we move on to the
social utility defense, there is an important line of reasoning that we have not yet
considered. Although natural law does not seem to support IPRs, is it possible
that it might actually mandate against such rights?
Doris Schroeder and Peter Singer
4
As this is not the place for a detailed excursion into natural law theory, we shall
confine ourselves to its most prominent thinker24: Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274).
According to Aquinas, laws are the dictates of practical reason. Natural law is the
rational, eternal order given to the universe by divine providence. Human
beings, as rational creatures, are subject to natural law ‘‘in the most excellent way,
in so far as . . . [they] partake . . . of a share of providence’’ through ‘‘an imprint on
us of the Divine light.’’25 This explains why natural law and natural rights are
universal, according to Aquinas, independent of local, earthly traditions that may
conflict with them. For him and his followers, natural law is ‘‘our intelligent
participation in God’s eternal law.’’26 It also explains why human beings can
know or recognize what is required of them by the natural law. Given that they
participate in eternal law as rational beings, they are able to identify ethical
demands on themselves.
The main ethical demand on human beings, according to Aquinas, is that
‘‘good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.’’ In one’s pursuit of
the good, the most important element is the preservation of human life, or as
Aquinas puts it:
Inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being,
according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is
a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles,
belongs to the natural law.27
The protection of human life is therefore paramount for Aquinas, and the right to
life is part of natural law. Another part of natural law is private property.
According to Aquinas, ‘‘it is lawful for man to possess property’’ for three main
reasons28:
First because every man is more careful to procure what is for himself
alone than that which is common to many or to all: since each one would
shirk the labor and leave to another that which concerns the community.
Secondly, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion
if each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself,
whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one
thing indeterminately.
Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is
contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise
more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed.
What then happens when the right to life collides with the right to property, for
instance, if some have more than they need while others are starving? Or if some
protect their intellectual property with the result that they are depriving the poor
of life-saving medication? According to Aquinas, the right to life takes pre-
cedence over the right to property. For him:
Whatever certain people have in superabundance is due, by natural
law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. . . . Since, however, there are
many who are in need, while it is impossible for all to be succored by
means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the stewardship of
his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of those
who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent,
that it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever
means be at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent
danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for
a man to succor his own need by means of another’s property, by
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taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft or
robbery.29
In the natural law tradition following Aquinas, the right to property or in-
tellectual property is therefore only valid as long as it does not interfere
significantly with the right to life. Although Aquinas promotes the concept of
property and hopes that the affluents’ benevolence will help the poor, he
supports the acquisition of another’s property without their consent in situations
of imminent danger to life.
This principle has been upheld by John Locke (1632–1704), one of the most
eminent Western theorists on property rights. According to Locke:
Charity gives every man a title to so much out of another’s plenty, as
will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist
otherwise.30
Does this mean that natural law mandates against intellectual property rights? It
was noted in the symposium introduction that 10 million people are dying every
year because of a lack of access to life-saving medicines and that this is partly
because of the current IPR regime. Would this not suggest that natural law
forbids IPRs or at least the current regime? No. The problem is more complex
than this, as IPRs also save millions of lives every year, given that they provide
incentives for pharmaceutical research. An assessment of the natural law
compatibility of IPRs would therefore require the loss of lives to be higher than
the number of lives saved. This is a calculation that is very difficult to make.
However, there is a more ambitious demand that could be drawn from natural
law theory that aligns better with the purpose of this article. Ideally, not only
would the number of lives lost be lower than the lives saved, but the lives lost
would be reduced to their utmost minimum. How this could be done requires an
examination of the social utility of IPR systems, a task we now turn to.
The Social Utility of Intellectual Property Rights
Given our above conclusions on natural rights, IPRs have to be assessed by
reference to the common good of humankind. In making this assessment, one
must consider the effects of the system relative to those of its politically available
alternatives. These effects depend on what the world is like: on present facts
about resources and scarcity as well as on the present international economic
order and distribution of wealth. Changes in the world may affect whether
current IPR rules are justified, for example, the rule that gives monopoly pricing
powers for 20 years to the creator of a life-saving second- or third-line
tuberculosis drug.
No IPR Protection
In the context of IPRs, it is sometimes pointed out what the world might look like
if we did not reward pharmaceutical innovations through patents. In such
a world, it is unlikely that innovative pharmaceutical research would take place,
at least as far as commercial companies were concerned. Their successful
research efforts would almost invariably result in economic losses as soon as
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competitors, unrestrained by the IPR system, copied their inventions and offered
the product at lower prices. Given that the competitors would not have to recoup
the research and development costs, their prices would be much more attractive
than the prices calculated to break even by the inventor. One can therefore argue
that it is better to have medicines for the affluent now, which are likely to trickle
down to the less affluent after the expiration of the monopoly period, than to
have no medicines at all.
However, this comparison simplifies the problem beyond recognition. It is not
sufficient to argue that the situation regarding access to life-saving medicines
could be even worse. We could all be without access to drugs. An ethical
assessment of the situation cannot focus exclusively on the worst possible
scenario but must instead consider whether the current situation can be
improved upon.
The Pre-TRIPS Regime31
Anand Grover clearly states that ‘‘TRIPS and FTAs have had an adverse impact
on prices and availability of [generic] medicines.’’32 One possible comparison
with the current situation is therefore the pre-TRIPS situation, which allowed
states to decide how to protect and reward their pharmaceutical industries on the
basis of their own interests.
An example33: before 2005, Indian law only allowed patents on processes, not
on products. As a result, India had a thriving generic pharmaceuticals industry
that supplied cheap copies of patented medicines throughout the world’s poor
regions. However, in 1994 India signed up to TRIPS as negotiated in the Uruguay
round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) treaty. Conse-
quently, India was required to introduce patents on products by January 2005.
It is important here to remember that the poor currently face two problems
when it comes to accessing life-saving drugs. First, because of the monopoly
pricing powers granted to innovators for considerable lengths of time, they
cannot afford medicines that are still under patent protection. The symposium
introduction referred to this as an accessibility problem (i.e., medicines are priced
beyond the reach of the poor). However, patent protection is not the only
problem endangering poor people’s health in the context of pharmaceutical
innovation. Given that the pharmaceutical industry operates almost exclusively
within the profit-making sector, diseases that primarily burden the poor are often
not investigated in the first place. These diseases are referred to as ‘‘neglected
diseases,’’ because they are often ignored by the international research commu-
nity. Hence, the second hindrance is the availability34 problem (i.e., drugs are not
being developed for the needs of the poor).35
The main argument against the pre-TRIPS regime is that it did not stimulate
the development of medicines for use in less developed countries. Given the lack
of patent protection in countries such as Brazil, India, or South Africa,
pharmaceutical companies could not rely on market exclusivity and were
therefore unlikely to take potential profits in such markets into consideration
when deciding upon research programs. Yet, these and other countries have
considerable and increasing affluent subpopulations, which would be able to
afford high drug prices.
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The argument in favour of the TRIPS regime with regard to developing
countries is therefore twofold: first, it has the potential to awaken pharmaceutical
interest in diseases that were hitherto not considered profitable in order to serve
an affluent minority. Second, in the long run, TRIPS may bring benefits to
developing countries as compared to the pre-TRIPS regime, in particular in the
area of so-called type III diseases, that is, diseases that occur exclusively or
overwhelmingly in poor countries. Pharmaceutical companies may well increase
research into type III diseases, secure in the knowledge of strict patent protection
and the prospect of achieving high monopoly prices from affluent patients,
government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). And al-
though access to such drugs may initially be confined to the more affluent,
much larger numbers of people should be able to benefit from their existence in
the long run, after the monopoly pricing interval has expired. It is too early,
however, for success stories of this kind.
Thus, the current regime is likely to have advantages over its predecessor with
regard to the availability problem (i.e., drugs are not being developed for the
needs of the poor). However, these advantages must be weighed against
problems regarding the accessibility problem (i.e., medicines are priced beyond
the reach of the poor). It is in this area that the pre-TRIPS regime has clear
advantages.
Before the TRIPS Agreement was adopted, most of the less developed
countries had weak intellectual property protections or none at all, which
enabled them to produce or import cheap generic versions of medicines that
were still under patent protection. Relative to pre-TRIPS, the current situation
therefore imposes a serious loss on the poor by pricing out of their reach new
medicines that they could previously have obtained at generic prices.36
It is difficult to estimate the relative effects of a set of social rules, that is, how
various groups of people fare differently under these rules than they would fare
if other rules, or none, existed. Moreover, decisions about the design of social
rules are rarely such that one option is unambiguously worse than another, that
is, worse for some and better for none.
However, the current situation is preferable for the population of affluent
countries, who gain access to additional medicines that would not have existed
without the additional market demand for patented medicines that is now
anticipated from less developed countries. The comparison is more complex in
the case of affluent minorities in less developed countries. They are better off
with regard to the availability problem; some new medicines would not have
existed without the TRIPS Agreement. At the same time, they are worse off with
regard to the accessibility problem. Although they are able to afford high
monopoly prices, they are no longer able to benefit from the low prices of
generic medicines. On balance, however, it seems plausible to argue that the
additionally created medicines for local health needs make up for the financial
losses for those who can afford under-patent drugs.
The social utility of the poor, who cannot afford monopoly prices, is the most
difficult factor to assess. The extension of strong intellectual property rights
through TRIPS into less developed countries burdens the poor disproportion-
ately, as they immediately lose access to generic copies of drugs that are still
under patent protection. On the other hand, this extension of intellectual
property rights may benefit the poor of the future, given that additional
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incentives are provided to address health needs in developing countries. Initially,
poor people would not be able to afford such new medicines. However, they may
benefit from purchases made on their behalf by aid agencies and governments,
and eventually the relevant patents will expire and prices will drop to just above
the marginal cost level.
The magnitude of these burdens and benefits is enormous, and decisions of
social utility are difficult to make. Currently, as Anand Grover has pointed out,
10 million deaths per year can be attributed to lack of access to life-saving
medicines 37 with at least part of this problem due to TRIPS and high monopoly
prices. The exclusion of the poor from access to advanced medicines will continue
to exact a heavy toll of disease and death for the indefinite future. On the other
hand, millions of people may survive or be healthy in the future, thanks to the
predicted availability of generic medicines that are likely to result from TRIPS.
Human-rights-focused philosophers may argue that it is morally impermissi-
ble to cause severe harms, including deaths, to some poor people now for the
sake of protecting millions of other poor people from similarly severe harms later
on. Given only these two choices, they would therefore endorse the pre-TRIPS
situation. Yet, one cannot be satisfied with such an outcome in view of all the
harm that could be averted from so many future lives by stimulating new drug
development. From a utilitarian perspective, one might therefore argue that the
overall benefits of TRIPS might have the potential to outweigh the overall losses.
Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that intellectual property rights systems have to be
designed with overall human well-being and flourishing in mind. They are not
mandated to secure the natural rights of inventors to have their creations
protected against the right to life of the poor.
The pre-TRIPS regime had certain advantages over the TRIPS regime. It
allowed the production and distribution of cheap copies of patented drugs by
generic manufacturers, mostly from India, South Africa, and Brazil. As a result,
some poor patients had access to life-saving drugs that are no longer available to
them today. Yet, the pre-TRIPS regime did not provide the pharmaceutical
industry with incentives to consider neglected diseases, which occur mostly in
developing countries. As a result, not even the affluent in developing countries
had their health needs served. Both systems therefore show some social utility,
but also room for improvement.
It is vital that considerable improvement on the current situation be made.
Although deaths from diseases such as tuberculosis had to be accepted as part of
life until the mid 20th century, this is no longer the case. Today, it is one of the stains
on humanity’s conscience that 10 million people die each year because of lack of
access to life-saving drugs. Some may not have access to doctors or pharmacies;
others may be so poor that they cannot afford even cheap generic drugs. Yet others
die because they are unable to pay high monopoly prices for drugs in a world
changed by the TRIPS agreement. In this context, we have previously endorsed
Thomas Pogge’s reform plan, the Health Impact Fund (HIF).38 The HIF was
described in earlier issues of this publication39, and we would like to reiterate our
support. It is, as the World Health Organization has established,40 a ‘‘promising
proposal,’’ and it is time to move from promise to reality.
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